Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory Opportunities for Survivors in Capital Cases by Mullett, Megan A
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 86 | Issue 4 Article 9
Fall 2011
Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating
Participatory Opportunities for Survivors in
Capital Cases
Megan A. Mullett
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mullett, Megan A. (2011) "Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory Opportunities for Survivors in Capital Cases,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 86: Iss. 4, Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol86/iss4/9
Fulfilling the Promise of Payne: Creating Participatory 
Opportunities for Survivors in Capital Cases 
MEGAN A. MULLETT∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court held in Payne v. Tennessee1 that the admissibility of 
victim impact evidence in capital cases is a question of state law,2 it opened the 
door to victims seeking greater participation in the criminal justice system.3 Payne 
was seen as a solid victory for victims’ rights advocates in that it adopted key 
values from the victims’ rights movement, namely that victims (including murder 
victims’ family members, referred to here as “survivors”), not just defendants, 
should have rights,4 and that victim impact evidence is “only fair” when the 
defendant has the right to introduce mitigation evidence.5 
In the two decades since Payne, it has become clear that opportunities to 
participate in capital cases have not been evenly distributed among all survivors. 
Some survivors are silenced6 because of due process considerations.7 Other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law—Bloomington; 
B.A., 2006, New York University. Thanks to Professor Jody Madeira, Notes & Comments 
Editors Cathy Homolka and Rob White, and Senior Managing Editor Megan Shipley for 
their guidance, support, and critiques of this Note. Thanks also to my parents for their love, 
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 1. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 2. Id. at 827. 
 3. While there is a variety of information that could be included in a victim impact 
statement, Payne specifically addressed the admissibility of information about the “victim’s 
attributes and value to society,” and “information about the impact of the murder on the 
survivors and the community at large.” Joseph L. Hoffmann, Revenge or Mercy? Some 
Thoughts About Survivor Opinion Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
530, 530 (2003). 
 4. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825–26. 
 5. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because our decision in Lockett recognizes the 
defendant’s right to introduce all mitigating evidence that may inform the jury about his 
character, the Court suggests that fairness requires that the State be allowed to respond with 
similar evidence about the victim. This argument is a classic non sequitur: The victim is not 
on trial; her character, whether good or bad, cannot therefore constitute either an aggravating 
or a mitigating circumstance.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); see also Evan J. 
Mandery, Notions of Symmetry and Self in Death Penalty Jurisprudence (With Implications 
for the Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence), 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 471 (2004) 
(analyzing the argument that admitting victim impact evidence is fair because it creates 
symmetry with the admissibility of a defendant’s mitigation evidence). 
 6. Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 543, 553 (2003) [hereinafter Mosteller, Real Rules] (“[A] victim’s right to 
be heard is not unlimited.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements at 
Capital Sentencing: Traditional and Nontraditional Perspectives, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 67 
(2001); Hoffmann, supra note 3; Erin O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 
13 J.L. & POL’Y 229 (2005). 
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survivors find their newly minted role usurped by prosecutors facing tremendous 
social and political pressures.8 Regardless of the reason, limiting who may speak 
and what they may say deprives survivors of the opportunity to fully participate in 
capital proceedings.9 This strategic silencing denies survivors the rights that the 
victims’ rights movement10 has worked so hard to have the criminal justice system 
acknowledge. Even today, there is disagreement about the role (if any) in the 
criminal justice system that the State is obliged to provide to survivors.11 States, 
however, have overwhelmingly recognized as legitimate survivors’ claim to a place 
in the criminal justice system.12 Once the State recognizes survivors’ claims as 
legitimate, it needs to provide a mechanism for all survivors to participate. 
Otherwise, the State runs the risk that a procedure devised to help survivors will 
hurt some of them when they are denied the participatory opportunities offered to 
others. 
This Note does not argue for the propriety of survivor participation generally or 
victim impact evidence specifically, both of which have been convincingly 
critiqued on everything from their constitutionality to their evidentiary relevance.13 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See Charles F. Baird & Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How 
Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose 
Capital Punishment, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 447 (2004); Brian L. Vander Pol, Note, 
Relevance and Reconciliation: A Proposal Regarding the Admissibility of Mercy Opinions in 
Capital Sentencing, 88 IOWA L. REV. 707, 709 & n.2 (2003) (describing the “acute (and ever 
intensifying) political pressure” on prosecutors “to seek the death penalty”). 
 9. As one commentator has noted, “Being afforded the right to participate in the 
solemn rite of a trial signals to the speaker that what she has to say is valued.” Mary 
Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, 
and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 433 (2008). 
 10. As mentioned previously, the term “survivors” is used here to encompass the family 
members of murder victims. The victims’ rights movement, however, encompasses all crime 
victims, of which survivors are a subset. Like all other victims, survivors are a part of the 
victims’ rights movement and are intended beneficiaries of the movement. 
 11. See, e.g., Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure”: The Limits of a Victim-
Centered Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 240 (2001) (“Whatever the 
actual merits and psychological benefits of individualization of victims’ experience of the 
process (e.g., ‘right to view’ statutes or ‘post-sentence victim allocution’), the social costs of 
an aggressively victim-centered discourse should be clear: it takes the focus off 
blameworthiness and individualization of the criminal accused, and attends to contingent and 
unstable emotions.” (footnote omitted)). 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 
10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17 (2000) (arguing that the admission of victim impact statements in 
capital cases fundamentally changed the sentencing process and improperly shifted the focus away 
from defendants and toward victims); Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the 
Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1999); Katie 
Morgan & Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Impact of Information Overload on the Capital 
Jury’s Ability to Assess Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1089, 
1090 (2009) (“In order to ease the potential effects of information overload, death penalty 
jurisdictions, with the approval of the Supreme Court, should reduce the amount of information 
presented at the penalty phase of capital trials. One logical way of doing this is to limit aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances at the penalty-selection stage to those that reflect on the individual 
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Rather, it points out that victim and survivor participation is the law of the land and 
thus a reality in our criminal justice system. Focusing on capital sentencing 
proceedings, this Note argues that the haphazard and inconsistent manner in which 
survivors are allowed to participate fails to further the values underlying federal 
and state victims’ rights statutes and Supreme Court case law regarding survivor 
participation by re-victimizing survivors through exclusion and silencing. 
To attempt to remedy survivor re-victimization while also addressing the 
concerns of critics of victims’ rights, this Note proposes a procedure known as 
“post-sentence victim allocution”14 as a feasible means to help survivors while 
sidestepping due process and trial strategy concerns. Post-sentence victim 
allocution is a formal procedure that occurs after sentencing and allows survivors to 
address the defendant and the court in front of the judge. While post-sentence 
victim allocution would not have any bearing on guilt or sentencing decisions, it 
could be open to the public. 
As the rhetoric of “closure” has permeated discussion surrounding and justifying 
capital punishment,15 survivors who participate in criminal proceedings have come 
to expect they should and will feel some degree of closure as a result of that 
participation.16 While closure has no accepted meaning in either the legal or clinical 
psychological context,17 the term “closure” is used here to convey a regained sense 
of control survivors may feel as they move toward peace with their new status as 
survivors.18 While it is true that not all survivors who participate experience closure 
from their participation,19 many find the experience to be both significant and 
                                                                                                                 
culpability of the offender for the crime of conviction.”); Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The 
Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 492 (2004) 
(recommending that courts limit the scope of victim impact evidence admitted during trial or 
sentencing). 
 14. Texas already provides a general right for victims to make a statement post-
sentence, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, § 1(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010), and 
Indiana provides specifically for a post-sentence statement by survivors in capital cases, IND. 
CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2004 & Supp. 2010). 
 15. See Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2009, at 1, 10 [hereinafter Bandes, Sociology of Emotion]. 
 16. See id.; Jody Lyneé Madeira, A Constructed Peace: Narratives of Suture in the 
News Media, 19 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 93, 108 (2004). But see Marilyn Peterson Armour & 
Mark S. Umbreit, The Ultimate Penal Sanction and “Closure” for Survivors of Homicide 
Victims, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 398 (2007) (“The notion of closure is rarely advanced by the 
survivors themselves. Many, if not most, vehemently deny that there is closure or that 
closure will ever be possible for them; they abhor the word because it implies ‘getting over 
it.’”). 
 17. See Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 16. 
 18. For a number of alternate definitions and conceptions of closure, see Armour & 
Umbreit, supra note 16, at 417–19; Kanwar, supra note 11, at 237–51. 
 19. See Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 16; cf. Kanwar, supra note 11, 
at 239 (“[I]ndividual requirements for ‘closure’ are so personal that it would be difficult to 
conceive of any generalized remedy that could be properly tailored to this purpose.”). 
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helpful.20 Silenced survivors are deprived of the opportunity to discover if 
participation would be beneficial to them.21  
Because it affects neither conviction nor sentencing, some may criticize post-
sentence victim allocution as an empty gesture—an opportunity for survivors who 
are foreclosed from “real” participation to merely vent their feelings. “Venting” 
itself can, however, be valuable,22 and post-sentence victim allocution provides an 
opportunity for survivors who would otherwise be excluded entirely from the 
criminal justice process to be heard. Revising victims’ rights statutes to provide for 
post-sentence victim allocution can benefit those survivors who may be excluded 
from giving victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase without infringing the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.23  
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the victims’ rights movement and the 
various state and federal statutes that have created a plethora of rights for victims to 
participate in criminal sentencing proceedings. It then analyzes the goals of the 
victims’ rights movement in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Booth v. 
Maryland,24 South Carolina v. Gathers,25 and Payne v. Tennessee.26 This Part 
concludes with a focus on what survivors seek to obtain from their interaction with 
the criminal justice system. Part II explains the two major obstacles to survivor 
participation: the systemic safeguards intended to protect defendants’ due process 
rights and the intense social and political pressures that come to bear on prosecutors 
in capital cases. Finally, Part III proposes that post-sentence victim allocution can 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. For a discussion of the potential for secondary victimization through participation, 
see Armour & Umbreit, supra note 16, at 413–17. 
 21. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 448.  
 22. See Giannini, supra note 9, at 435 (“While victim allocution exists partly to give 
victims an opportunity to provide information that could affect the court’s sentencing 
determination, the practice also exists to enhance the dignity of the speaker, to provide the 
speaker with a therapeutic and cathartic outlet, to educate other participants in the sentencing 
proceeding, and to enhance the perceived fairness of the legal system.”); Jody Lyneé 
Madeira, When It’s So Hard to Relate: Can Legal Systems Mitigate the Trauma of Victim-
Offender Relationships?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 401, 461 (2009) [hereinafter Madeira, When It’s 
So Hard to Relate] (noting that post-adjudication mediation, while outside the context of the 
courtroom completely, nonetheless “offers victims and their family members the opportunity 
to replace the involuntary, negative para-social ties that characterize the victim-offender 
relationship with voluntary and likely more positive interpersonal dialogue”). 
 23. Cf. Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 13 (“Some survivors may 
benefit from the ability to participate, and some may feel co-opted or re-victimized by the 
process. There are also significant risks to the capital defendant, who is entitled to a jury 
whose decision about whether to take or spare his life is based on constitutionally acceptable 
criteria.”); Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
54–55 (2010) (“[A]lthough some have argued that victim participation does not necessarily 
cause detriment to defendants, the victims’ rights movement and victim impact law generally 
assume an adversarial relationship. While admitting victims’ statements of anger and 
anguish, courts continue to prohibit victims from advocating against the death penalty.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 24. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
 25. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
 26. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
2011] FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF PAYNE 1621 
 
eliminate silencing by providing a mechanism for participation to those survivors 
who may be unable or unwilling to provide victim impact evidence. 
I. CREATING A ROLE FOR VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS 
The idea of “victims’ rights” is a relatively recent innovation in modern criminal 
law.27 The central purpose of the American criminal justice system is to determine 
the guilt or innocence of a defendant and to impose the proper punishment, not to 
protect victims.28 Because the criminal justice system has been structured to focus 
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, many victims feel shut out or ignored.29 
As a report prepared by Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation explains, 
“Victimization is about powerlessness; victims’ rights are about the reclaiming of 
power. Being victimized strips people of their dignity; victims’ rights offer 
opportunities to restore dignity. Murder silences its victims; victims’ rights let the 
surviving family have a voice in the aftermath of the trauma.”30 This Part will first 
discuss the history and evolution of the victims’ rights movement and the ways in 
which victims are currently able to participate at both the state and federal levels. 
Because “death is different,”31 the rights and remedies available to victims of 
noncapital crimes have not necessarily been extended to survivors of murder 
victims. After discussing victims’ rights generally, this Part focuses on survivors’ 
rights specifically and concludes with an explanation of capital trial procedures and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) 
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE]. Assertion of victims’ rights is still also highly 
contested. See Kanwar, supra note 11, at 223. 
 28. See Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Sentencing: A 
History of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 404 (1996) (“The purpose of the 
sentencing phase is a determination as to whether the defendant should be spared the death 
penalty or whether he should receive it. The focus is no longer on the amount of harm he 
caused others through his crime. It is purely on the defendant himself. The sentencing phase 
is not designed to be a contest between the victim and the defendant as to whose life is worth 
more. With the admission of victim impact evidence, the defendant will surely lose in most 
instances.”). 
 29. Chief Justice Richard Barajas & Scott Alexander Nelson, The Proposed Crime 
Victims’ Federal Constitutional Amendment: Working Toward a Proper Balance, 49 
BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1997); Giannini, supra note 9, at 439 (“Victims’ rights advocates 
have emphasized this imperfection of the public prosecution model by pointing out that 
‘while criminal defendants have an array of rights under law,’ ‘victims, and their families, 
[are] ignored, cast aside, . . . treated as non-participants in a critical event in their lives,’ and 
granted few rights or protections throughout the criminal justice process.” (alterations in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Senate Floor Statements in Support of the Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act, 105 Cong. Rec. S460, S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of 
Sen. Feinstein), reprinted in Senate Floor Statements in Support of the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 62, 63 (2006))). 
 30. ROBERT RENNY CUSHING & SUSANNAH SHEFFER, MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR 
RECONCILIATION, DIGNITY DENIED: THE EXPERIENCE OF MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILY MEMBERS 
WHO OPPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY 8 (2002). 
 31. E.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[D]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions . . . .”). 
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an analysis of the three Supreme Court opinions dealing with the propriety and 
admissibility of victim impact evidence in the capital context. 
A. The Victims’ Rights Movement 
Emerging in the late 1970s,32 agitation for victims’ rights has developed over the 
last several decades into a cohesive movement,33 of which the survivors’ rights 
movement is an integral part. Previously, “[v]ictims . . . were simply not entitled to 
[either] support or standing in the criminal justice system as it existed. These 
parties were voiceless throughout the proceedings, and as a result, often felt ‘re-
victimized’ by the system that was set up to help them.”34 The victims’ rights 
movement grew out of a widespread sentiment that the legal system did not accord 
victims the respect or sympathy they deserved, and this lack of support resulted in 
negative interactions with the criminal justice system.35 As it grew, the victims’ 
rights movement became a “more or less organized social movement that advocates 
changes in criminal law and procedure designed to provide crime victims, 
collectively and individually, more satisfaction within the legal system.”36 
While the desires of specific victims are deeply personal, the shared core belief 
of the victims’ rights movement is that victims have a right to be heard in criminal 
justice proceedings37 and that participation is a valuable experience.38 Underlying 
this belief is the premise that victims desire and deserve empowerment or closure 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. See MARLENE YOUNG & JOHN STEIN, NAT’L ORG. FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, THE 
HISTORY OF THE CRIME VICTIMS’ MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2005/pg4c.html. 
 33. Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 451–52. For more information on the victims’ 
rights movement and the plethora of social services that have been established to support 
victims and survivors, see YOUNG & STEIN, supra note 32. 
 34. Dugger, supra note 28, at 377; see also O’Hara, supra note 7, at 239 (“[V]ictims are 
often completely sidelined in the criminal process. Many victims never have an opportunity 
to meet with the prosecutors in their cases and those who do very often report that they do 
not feel as though their concerns were taken into account.”). 
 35. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 451; see also PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra 
note 27, at 77 (“The idea that the victim should speak at sentencing has been met with 
resistance. That opposition and the force with which it has been projected by judges and 
lawyers is one measure of their lack of concern for victims. It is also an indication of how 
much is wrong with the sentencing system.”). 
 36. Kanwar, supra note 11, at 223. 
 37. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 33–35. 
 38. Giannini, supra note 9, at 451 (“The transformative nature of the ritual of trial is 
particularly important when one examines crime from a relational standpoint. Through the 
commission of crime, the defendant’s acts place him in a position superior to the individual 
he has harmed. The defendant’s acts objectify the victim by treating that person as a means 
to an end—the commission of the crime—and simultaneously indicate his belief that 
community norms do not apply to him. While others may be bound to follow the law, the 
offender, by departing from social norms, emphasizes that he rejects being a part of, and 
living in relation to, his community. Crime, then, represents a social and moral imbalance 
between the victim, defendant, and society. The legal system, and more specifically, the 
ritual of trial, seeks to redress this imbalance.”). 
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from their participation in trial or sentencing proceedings.39 Additionally, 
participation may prove therapeutic for some victims by promoting recovery from 
their trauma, as well as making them feel as though things are “fair” because they 
had the opportunity to be heard.40 
Since the beginning of the victims’ rights movement, scholars have debated the 
proper role of the victim in the criminal justice system41 and the proper role of the 
criminal justice system in helping victims with the healing and closure process.42 In 
the wake of a violent crime, especially murder, survivors experience a wide range 
of emotions and, correspondingly, desire a wide range of outcomes from the 
criminal justice system.43 These outcomes include information as to what happened 
to a loved one and why, justice for the loved one, revenge against the perpetrator, 
and closure on an emotionally painful experience. They also have a host of other 
needs that the criminal justice system cannot meet, such as loss of companionship 
or financial support from the immediate victim of the crime. However, the 
existence of a coherent victims’ rights movement speaks eloquently to victims’ 
shared desire for opportunities for greater participation in the criminal justice 
process and their common belief that such participation is central to achieving 
empowerment44 and, ultimately, closure.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. Mosteller, Real Rules, supra note 6, at 548 (discussing the “growing use of the 
concept of victim catharsis to justify victim impact evidence”); id. at 548–49 (“I suspect 
victim catharsis is an implicit motivation behind the giving, and perhaps the receipt, of many 
victim impact statements. What appears to be happening is an effort by the survivor or 
victim to bring ‘closure’ to an event; to have catharsis.”); id. at 554 (“Society, in a pop-
psychology-way, appears to have embraced the propriety of statements directed at 
defendants for the purpose of helping to heal the victim. For this purpose, the impact 
evidence becomes even more visceral and even more difficult to constrain using ordinary 
rules of due process, probativity versus prejudice, relevance, and reasonableness.”). 
 40. Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 
611–12 (2009). 
 41. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, The Effect of Victim-Impact Evidence on the Defense, 
CRIM. JUST., Spring 1993, at 24 [hereinafter Mosteller, Effect]. 
 42. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and 
the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1603 (2000) [hereinafter Bandes, 
Closure]. 
 43. See id. at 1602–03 (“The little empirical evidence of which I am aware supports the 
intuitively obvious view that different victims have different needs, and that an individual 
victim’s needs may change over time.”). 
 44. See Jody Lyneé Madeira, “Why Rebottle the Genie?”: Capitalizing on Closure in 
Death Penalty Proceedings, 85 IND. L.J. 1477, 1511 (2010) [hereinafter Madeira, Why 
Rebottle the Genie?] (“Creating a narrative of a murder’s aftermath is one way to establish 
some degree of control, and may indeed aid victims’ families in coming to terms with their 
new status and its implications.”). 
 45. This is not intended to be an argument for the objective existence of closure. Rather, 
it is an acknowledgement of the cultural existence of the idea of closure, which permeates 
discussion of victims’ rights and is held out as the ultimate result that survivors desire. For 
an in-depth discussion of the role of closure in capital proceedings, see id. 
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B. Existing Victims’ Rights 
The victims’ rights movement has been very successful in attracting attention 
and support for its goals. Various strategies have been developed on both state and 
national levels to afford victims a greater role in the criminal justice process. A key 
element of the creation, acknowledgement, and protection of these participatory 
rights has been the passage of federal and state statutes, intended to create 
participatory opportunities for victims.46 All fifty states as well as the federal 
government have enacted some form of victims’ rights legislation.47 On the state 
level, some states have amended their constitutions to provide for victims’ rights,48 
while other states have enacted statutes that provide for victim participation or for 
services and amenities for victims.49  
At the federal level, the Victims of Crime Act, enacted in 1984, authorized 
collection of monetary damages from convicted criminals, which are then 
distributed to states to fund services for victims.50 The federal Victims’ Rights and 
Restitution Act (known as the “Victims’ Bill of Rights”), enacted in 1990, grants 
victims the right to be notified of and present at all stages of the criminal 
prosecution and to be informed about the status of trial, sentencing, and parole 
matters.51 Several additional federal statutes expanding victim access to trials were 
enacted in the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City.52  
More recently, President Bush signed the Justice for All Act into law in 2004.53 
The Act modifies some existing rights, but it also adds some significant new rights 
including the right of victims “to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Cf. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 29, at 17. 
 47. Victoria Schwartz, The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 526 
(2005); see, e.g., IND. CONST. Art. I, § 13(b) (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401 to 
13-4440 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02 (2010). 
 48. See, e.g., IND. CONST. Art. I, § 13(b) (2009) (“Victims of crime, as defined by law, 
shall have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal 
justice process; and, as defined by law, to be informed of and present during public hearings 
and to confer with the prosecution, to the extent that exercising these rights does not infringe 
upon the constitutional rights of the accused.”). 
 49. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4401 to 13-4440 (2010) (“Crime Victims’ 
Rights”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02 (2010) (enumerating statutory rights of victims and 
witnesses of crimes). 
 50. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 454; 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006). 
 51. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 454; 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006). 
 52. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (requiring closed-circuit televising of proceedings for victims in cases where 
the trial venue is moved out of state and more than 350 miles from which it originally would 
have taken place); Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-6, 111 Stat. 12 
(preventing judges from excluding victims who plan to give victim impact evidence from the 
courtroom during trial). 
 53. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260; see also OVC 
FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, THE JUSTICE FOR ALL 
ACT (Apr. 2006), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/justforall/fs000 
311.pdf. 
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involving release, plea, or sentencing.”54 A subsequent Ninth Circuit case55 
interpreting a portion of the Justice for All Act called the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act (CVRA)56 found that Congress intended for victims to be able to actually speak 
at sentencing, not just submit written victim impact statements,57 and that the right 
to speak extends to any criminal sentencing, even if there is more than one 
sentencing proceeding in the case.58 In his opinion for the panel, Judge Kozinski 
noted that “[t]he criminal justice system has long functioned on the assumption that 
crime victims should behave like good Victorian children—seen but not heard. The 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act sought to change this by making victims independent 
participants in the criminal justice process.”59 That independence is key both for 
victims—who may be unable or unwilling to work through the prosecutor—and for 
prosecutors—who can worry less about being improperly influenced by highly 
sympathetic victims.60 
Despite the widespread creation of a greater role for victims, constitutional 
considerations prohibit an even balancing between the rights of victims and those 
of defendants.61 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the capital sentencing arena, 
where survivor participation has been a matter of great debate and controversy.62 
The remainder of this Part will explain the justifications given for survivor 
participation in capital sentencing proceedings and the current state of the law 
regarding survivor participation. It concludes with an analysis of the three Supreme 
Court opinions dealing with the admissibility of victim impact evidence in capital 
sentencing proceedings. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. OVC FACT SHEET, supra note 53, at 2. The OVC Fact Sheet is careful to note, 
however, that “the Act is not intended to impair prosecutorial discretion in the handling of 
the case.” Id.  
 55. Kenna v. U.S. Dis’t. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006). 
 57. Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. A district court interpreting the CVRA went even further, 
declaring “even if a victim has nothing to say that would directly alter the court’s sentence, a 
chance to speak still serves important purposes. As the First Circuit has pithily explained, 
‘allocution is both a rite and a right.’” United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 
1349 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 
1994)). 
 58. Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. 
 59. Id. at 1013. 
 60. See infra Part II.B. For a more detailed analysis of the CVRA, see Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Allocution and the Purposes of Victim Participation Under the CVRA, 19 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 44 (2006); Giannini, supra note 9. 
 61. Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 361, 392–93 (1996) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy] (“Victim impact statements 
are stories that should not be told, at least not in the context of capital sentencing, because 
they block the jury’s ability to hear the defendant’s story. Moreover, they evoke emotions 
that do not belong in that context.”). 
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C. Survivor Participation in Capital Sentencing Proceedings 
Particular attention has been paid to survivors of murder victims because society 
recognizes that the violent death of a loved one is an especially severe trauma.63 As 
Armour and Umbreit have noted, “Although murder is a social issue that affects the 
survival and safety of civilized society, survivors are the ones most directly 
affected by the crime and how society responds to it.”64 Because they are the ones 
most directly affected, survivor participation can also increase the perceived 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system.65 When the crime is one that may warrant 
the imposition of the death penalty, survivors’ views and opinions have become 
central to prosecutorial decision making.66 In some cases, prosecutors may be so 
deferential to survivors that survivor views become “dispositive with respect to the 
prosecutor’s decision to accept a guilty plea.”67  
The opportunity to participate and be heard throughout the proceeding is 
important to many survivors.68 Some “seek both revenge and strong social 
condemnation of criminals”69 as well as “vindication and validation from 
society.”70 Some hope or believe that participation will heal them,71 empower them, 
or help them to regain control of their lives72 as they attempt to come to terms with 
the effects of the crime.73 Survivor participation provides a means for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The 
Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 575–76 (2005). 
 64. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 16, at 422. 
 65. Giannini, supra note 9, at 433. 
 66. Gershman, supra note 63, at 575–76 (“There is one area in which the victim’s 
concerns receive special attention: death penalty cases. Such disparate treatment probably is 
not uncommon. In deciding whether to seek the death penalty or allow a capital defendant to 
plead guilty to a certain term of life imprisonment, some prosecutors may rely heavily on the 
views of the victim’s family. . . . To these prosecutors, as well as under the law, the 
magnitude of the crime and the enormous impact it has on the survivors apparently gives 
them a special claim to being heard on the ultimate punishment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. A report prepared by Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation identified several 
rights as particularly important: (1) the right to speak and be heard through the criminal 
justice process, (2) the right to receive information about the process, and (3) the right to 
receive help from victims’ advocates. CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 9. 
 69. O’Hara, supra note 7, at 234. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Cassell, supra note 40, at 621–23. 
 72. Madeira, Why Rebottle the Genie?, supra note 44, at 1512 (“Successful 
participation—defined by one’s ability to carry out the participative task, not by sentencing 
outcome—restores agency and control and allows for the display of self-control, allowing 
the victim to step away from a state of perceived powerlessness, silence, and incapacity.”).  
 73. O’Hara, supra note 7, at 244 (“Experts on the psychological effects of crime have 
emphasized the importance to victims of [participation] by noting that ‘failure to offer 
victims a chance to participate in criminal proceedings can “result in increased feelings of 
inequity on the part of victims, with a corresponding increase in crime-related psychological 
harm.”’ At the same time, ‘there is mounting evidence that “having a voice may improve 
victims’ mental condition and welfare.” For some victims, making a statement helps restore 
balance between themselves and the offenders.’” (quoting 2002 Victims’ Rights Amendment: 
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“acknowledging the victim’s wishes to be treated with dignity; promoting 
psychological healing; and reminding judges, juries, and prosecutors that behind 
the state’s case is a real person with a real interest in the case’s resolution.”74  
It is also important for survivors to have the opportunity to participate and speak 
for themselves, because they (or their needs) are often invoked as a justification for 
pursuing a particular legal decision.75 In capital cases, this often takes the form of 
the prosecutor urging the jury to impose the death penalty out of a sense of 
responsibility to and respect for the murder victim and his or her survivors.76 
Implicit in such rhetoric is the assertion that “failure to sentence a particular 
defendant to death or to a long prison term is . . . devaluing of the worth of the 
victim’s life.”77 Additionally, invocations of the emotional and psychological needs 
of survivors are specifically used to justify capital sentences, as it is commonly 
assumed that a death sentence and subsequent execution will provide survivors 
with the closure they seek.78 As Armour and Umbreit point out, “Until survivors 
speak for themselves . . . society will continue to project its hoped-for outcome on 
their experiences, and the voice of survivors will only be heard in reaction to the 
presumptions and misrepresentations of their journey.”79 
                                                                                                                 
Hearings on H.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2d Sess. 57 (2002) (prepared statement of Steven J. Twist)) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 74. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 538. 
 75. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 815 (1991) (quoting prosecutor’s 
closing argument which specifically invoked the future needs of the surviving victim as a 
justification for imposition of a death sentence); see also Gruber, supra note 23, at 56–57 
(“Today, prosecutors seeking the death penalty do not just present the arguably foreseeable 
effects of death on family members; they introduce evidence regarding community opinion, 
highly inflammatory descriptions of decompositions and burials, and even carefully crafted 
videos portraying the victim from childhood through adulthood. The undertone of all these 
strategies is to remind the jury that it can vindicate victims’ interests (both living and dead) 
by imposing the death penalty.”); Kanwar, supra note 11, at 216 (“[T]he cultural production 
of a feeling of closure for the [survivors] has become, at least implicitly, an independent 
justification for the retention and enforcement of the death penalty in the United States.”). 
 76. Bandes, Closure, supra note 42, at 1605. It was precisely this conflation of the 
culpability of the defendant with the suffering of the victim or the survivors that the Supreme 
Court found to create a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death 
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it held victim impact evidence to be 
unconstitutional in Booth v. Maryland. 482 U.S. 496, 502–03 (1987); see also Mosteller, 
Effect, supra note 41, at 26. 
 77. Bandes, Closure, supra note 42, at 1605; see also Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, 
supra note 15, at 8 (“Institutional structure is influenced by assumptions about what people 
feel and ought to feel.”). 
 78. Ironically, as mercy opinions (in which victims express their desire for mercy in the 
sentencing of the defendant) are generally excluded from victim impact evidence as 
irrelevant, survivors who will not find closure in a death sentence or execution are prevented 
from correcting this erroneous assumption and, at the same time, their silence is often 
assumed to be tacit acceptance of or support for a death sentence. See CUSHING & SHEFFER, 
supra note 30, at 8–9. 
 79. Armour & Umbreit, supra note 16, at 424. 
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Thirty-four states, the federal government, and the U.S. military have capital 
punishment.80 Thirty states allow some form of victim impact evidence in capital 
trials, while the remaining four states have yet to determine its admissibility.81 This 
type of jurisdictional variation is another way survivors can be silenced. Because 
the admissibility of victim impact evidence is a matter of state law, survivors in 
states that narrowly circumscribe its use (or prohibit it outright) may be deprived of 
an opportunity available to survivors in other states. 
The opportunity to participate may take several forms. First, the survivor, if she 
or he was a witness to the crime or has other information about the crime itself, 
may be called as a witness during the guilt phase of the trial. Second, once guilt has 
been established, the prosecutor may informally seek survivors’ input on 
sentencing before making a sentencing recommendation.82 Third, survivors may 
give victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase in which they personally 
share with the jury the effect of the crime.83 Any of these avenues of participation 
has the potential to help survivors move toward closure as a result of “the sense of 
catharsis that comes of speaking publicly about one’s loss.”84  
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (Mar. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. Those states are 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, 
and Wyoming. Id. While New Mexico no longer has the death penalty, two inmates remain 
on death row. Id. For more information on the use of victim impact evidence in federal 
capital trials, see Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 
FED. SENT’G REP. 5 (2006) (surveying federal capital trials since Payne that have permitted 
victim impact evidence). 
 81. Cf. John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 268 (2003). Since Professor Blume published his study four states 
have repealed the death penalty—Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York. See 
John Schwartz & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at A18; Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New 
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-
jersey.html; Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A16; 
Al Baker, Effort to Reinstate Death Penalty Law Is Stalled in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2004, at A1. 
 82. Gershman, supra note 63, at 575–76. 
 83. For example, in Payne, where Charisse Christopher and her young daughter died but 
her toddler son Nicholas survived, the prosecution called Charisse’s mother to testify about 
the effect of the murders on Nicholas. She testified, “He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem 
to understand why she doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie.” Later, in his 
closing argument, the prosecutor recalled this testimony:  
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He’s going 
to want to know what happened. And he is going to know what happened to his 
baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know what type of justice 
was done. He is going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you 
will provide the answer. 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814–15 (1991).  
 84. Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 2. This is a narrow definition of 
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Capital trials differ from other criminal trials in a number of ways. Capital trials 
are generally bifurcated into two phases—a guilt phase and a sentencing phase.85 
The same judge presides and the same jury tries both phases, but the determination 
of guilt is separated from the imposition of the sentence.86 A defendant who is 
convicted of a capital crime in the trial phase is considered to be “death eligible” in 
the sentencing phase.87 In the sentencing phase, the prosecution introduces any 
aggravating factors that warrant the imposition of a death sentence,88 and the 
defense introduces any mitigating factors that would make the imposition of a 
death sentence inappropriate.89 Each state determines which offenses are 
considered capital crimes in that state, as well as which aggravating or mitigating 
factors are admissible for consideration.90 Only when the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors is the imposition of a death sentence appropriate.91  
D. Payne and Its Progenitors 
It is this balancing of aggravation and mitigation that ultimately led victims’ 
rights advocates to argue that “fairness requires that the State be allowed to respond 
[to mitigation evidence] with similar evidence about the victim.”92 The Supreme 
Court has confronted this issue in three cases. After twice rejecting victim impact 
                                                                                                                 
closure, and many scholars agree that speaking publicly about the murder is merely one 
potential avenue toward catharsis or closure. See, e.g., Madeira, Why Rebottle the Genie?, 
supra note 44, at 1482–85. But see Bandes, Empathy, supra note 62, at 405 (“A major 
problem with victim impact statements is that they may not be helpful to the victim—or even 
true to the victim’s experience—despite the victims’ rights rhetoric.”). 
 85. See MICHAEL DOW BURKHEAD, A LIFE FOR A LIFE: THE AMERICAN DEBATE OVER THE 
DEATH PENALTY 67 (2009); e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191 (1976). 
 86. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2006). 
 87. Dugger, supra note 28, at 385; Morgan & Mannheimer, supra note 13, at 1094. 
 88. Morgan & Mannheimer, supra note 13, at 1094. 
 89. See JENNIFER L. CULBERT, DEAD CERTAINTY: THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF JUDGMENT 91 (2008); see, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1978) 
(“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in 
all but the rarest kind of capital cases, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 90. See CULBERT, supra note 89, at 91. 
 91. Dugger, supra note 28, at 385. 
 92. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 859 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). Susan Bandes has criticized the Payne Court’s acceptance of this argument, 
pointing out, 
Payne incorrectly assumes that victim impact statements remedy an 
inequality of treatment between victim and defendant. However, there is no 
requirement of parity in the treatment of victim and defendant. . . .  
. . . [E]ven assuming the playing field between victim and defendant ought 
to be level, the Payne Court is incorrect in believing that victim impact 
statements achieve this purpose. 
Bandes, Empathy, supra note 62, at 402–03 (footnotes omitted). 
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evidence as unconstitutional in the late 1980s,93 it reversed course in 1991, ruling 
that the admissibility of victim impact evidence was a matter of state law.94 
The Supreme Court first confronted victim impact evidence in Booth v. 
Maryland in 1987. John Booth was found guilty of two counts of first-degree 
murder for the stabbing deaths of an elderly couple, the Bronsteins; his accomplice, 
Willie Reid, was convicted as a principal in the first degree for the death of Mrs. 
Bronstein.95 Pursuant to a Maryland statute, the presentence report compiled by the 
State Division of Parole and Probation contained a victim impact statement which 
detailed “any physical injury suffered by the victim . . . along with its seriousness 
and permanence” as well as “any request for psychological services initiated by the 
victim or the victim’s family.”96 Holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a 
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence,97 the opinion 
emphasized that sentencing considerations should focus on the defendant’s 
culpability.98 
Two years later, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in South Carolina v. 
Gathers99 to address an issue left open by Booth, specifically whether “the kind of 
information contained in victim impact statements could be admissible if it 
‘relate[d] directly to the circumstances of the crime.’”100 Demetrius Gathers was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death for killing Richard Haynes.101 During 
the commission of the crime, Gathers went through Haynes’ belongings and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 
U.S. 805, 810–12 (1989). 
 94. Payne, 501 U.S. at 808. 
 95. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498 & n.1. 
 96. Id. at 498–99. I highlighted these two considerations because they are typical of the 
information included in victim impact evidence. The statute required the Victim Impact 
Statement to contain six pieces of information: 
(i) Identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense 
along with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) Describe any change in the victim’s personal welfare or familial 
relationships as a result of the offense; 
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the 
victim’s family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the 
victim or the victim’s family that the trial court requires. 
Id. (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986)). 
 97. Id. at 509. 
 98. Id. at 502 (asserting that sentencing considerations should focus on the defendant’s 
“record, characteristics, and the circumstances of the crime”); id. at 504 (“While the full 
range of foreseeable consequences of a defendant’s actions may be relevant in other criminal 
and civil contexts, we cannot agree that it is relevant in the unique circumstance of a capital 
sentencing hearing.”). 
 99. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
 100. Id. at 811 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10). 
 101. Id. at 806–07. 
2011] FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF PAYNE 1631 
 
scattered them around.102 These belongings, including Haynes’ voter registration 
card and some religious tracts, were admitted as evidence during the guilt phase of 
the trial.103 The prosecutor referenced this evidence, which was readmitted during 
the sentencing phase, in closing arguments, at one point reading extensively from a 
religious tract.104 Despite the fact that the evidence had been admitted at trial and 
the fact that that the evidence arguably related directly to the circumstances of the 
crime, the Supreme Court found that “the content of the various papers the victim 
happened to be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortuitous and cannot 
provide any information relevant to the defendant’s moral culpability.”105 As the 
evidence did not relate directly to the circumstances of the crime, the jury should 
not have considered it during sentencing. 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Gathers echoes a tenet of the victims’ rights 
argument, the idea that victim impact evidence should be seen as an analog of and 
counterweight to mitigation evidence presented by the defense.106 The thought is 
that it is “only fair” that prosecutors be allowed to introduce victim impact 
evidence when defendants introduce mitigation evidence.107 Leaving the jury with 
only mitigation evidence does not tell the whole story and improperly focuses the 
jury on the defendant’s personal history, rather than the crime of which he or she is 
accused and its consequences to others.108 From the survivors’ point of view, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 806–11. 
 104. Id. at 811–12. 
 105. Id. at 812. 
 106. See id. at 817–18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that mitigation evidence is not 
“directly relevant” to the crime, but is “relevant to the jury’s assessment of respondent 
himself and his moral blameworthiness”). 
 107. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 520 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To 
require . . . that all mitigating factors which render capital punishment a harsh penalty in the 
particular case be placed before the sentencing authority, while simultaneously requiring, as 
we do today, that evidence of much of the human suffering the defendant has inflicted be 
suppressed, is in effect to prescribe a debate on the appropriateness of the capital penalty 
with one side muted.”). 
 108. See id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (“I would think that victim impact statements 
are particularly appropriate evidence in capital sentencing hearings: the State has a legitimate 
interest in counteracting the mitigation evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in . . . 
by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, 
so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in 
particular to his family.”); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826 (1991) (“It is an 
affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that at sentencing in a capital case, 
a parade of witnesses may praise the background, character and good deeds of 
Defendant . . . , without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon 
the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.” (quoting State v. Payne, 791 
S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990)); id. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Indeed, given a 
defendant’s option to introduce relevant evidence in mitigation, sentencing without such 
evidence of victim impact may be seen as a significantly imbalanced process.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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justice demands that the victim’s story be told at the same time and with the same 
import as the defendant’s.109 
This appeal to fairness ultimately prevailed in Payne v. Tennessee,110 which held 
that the Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar to victim impact evidence, 
and that its admissibility is a matter for state law.111 The Court characterized victim 
impact evidence as “simply another form or method of informing the sentencing 
authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a 
general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”112 Victim impact evidence 
is therefore characterized instrumentally, as a tool to assist the finder of fact in 
ascertaining the full degree of harm caused by the crime.113  
The dissenters in Payne, however, were highly skeptical of this argument. 
Justice Marshall, for example, expressed many of the concerns that had prompted 
the majorities in both Booth114 and Gathers115 to exclude victim impact evidence:  
As Justice Powell explained in Booth, the probative value of [victim 
impact] evidence is always outweighed by its prejudicial effect because 
of its inherent capacity to draw the jury’s attention away from the 
character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime to such 
illicit considerations as the eloquence with which family members 
express their grief and the status of the victim in the community.116 
Interestingly, the majorities in both Booth and Gathers and the dissenters in 
Payne assume that victim impact evidence would be damaging to the defendant, 
implicitly accepting the premise that mercy opinions (in which victims express 
their desires for mercy in the sentencing of the defendant) would not be admissible 
as victim impact evidence.117 In his dissent in Payne, Justice Stevens asserts that 
victim impact evidence “serves no purpose other than to encourage jurors to decide 
in favor of death rather than life on the basis of their emotions rather than their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 72 (“The victim, no less than the 
defendant, comes to court seeking justice. When the court hears . . . from the defendant, his 
lawyer, his family and friends, his minister, and others, simple fairness dictates that the 
person who has borne the brunt of the defendant’s crime be allowed to speak.”). 
 110. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 111. Id. at 827 (“We thus hold that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim 
impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects 
no per se bar. A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about 
the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to 
whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. There is no reason to treat such 
evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated.” (emphasis in original)). 
 112. Id. at 825. 
 113. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 27. 
 114. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 503–06 (1987). 
 115. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810–12 (1989). 
 116. Payne, 501 U.S. at 846 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 117. As one commentator pointed out, “In light of the rhetoric of individualization of 
victims’ desires for closure that permeates the Victims’ Rights Movement, it is hypocritical 
to deny mercy pleas from similarly situated [survivors] who would be able to enter a 
statement if they supported death.” Kanwar, supra note 11, at 248. 
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reason.”118 These types of concerns have served as significant obstacles to survivor 
participation in capital sentencing proceedings. 
II. OBSTACLES TO SURVIVOR PARTICIPATION 
Victim impact evidence has been seen as inconsistent with the traditional 
societal goals of sentencing.119 Because capital defendants are entitled to greater 
procedural protection than noncapital defendants,120 concern for systemic integrity 
leads to fears about victim impact evidence’s potentially negative effect on 
defendants’ due process rights.121 Additionally, various practical considerations 
might lead a prosecutor to exclude a survivor from his or her witness list for the 
sentencing phase. From the survivor’s point of view, both limitation on expression 
and outright exclusion are forms of silencing, and either can frustrate the survivor’s 
attempts to work through trauma by participating. 
As briefly discussed earlier, victim impact evidence is admitted by most states, 
and most death penalty states permit some sort of survivor statement. However, it 
has long been recognized that “death is different,”122 and a significant amount of 
attention has been paid to the systemic ramifications of permitting victim impact 
evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. Legitimacy concerns, such as whether 
the public views the justice system as fair and impartial, give rise to procedural due 
process protections for the defendant. The rise of the victims’ rights movement, 
however, demonstrated that the public will not perceive the justice system to be 
legitimately just unless crime victims feel vindicated, which typically requires more 
than merely securing a conviction. Many victims want to participate to regain 
feelings of agency or control or to find catharsis or closure in the experience, 
regardless of the outcome.123 Greater victim participation leads, however, to 
renewed concerns about how victims’ rights will impact defendants’ rights. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Payne, 501 U.S. at 856 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Bandes, Empathy, supra 
note 62, at 401 (“Contrary to Justice Stevens’s assertion in his dissent in Payne, the problem 
with victim impact statements is not that they evoke emotion rather than reason. Rather, it is 
that they evoke unreasoned, unreflective emotion that cannot be placed in any usable 
perspective. In evidentiary terms, victim impact statements are prejudicial and 
inflammatory.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 119. Dugger, supra note 28, at 403. 
 120. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital 
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004). 
 121. See Walker A. Matthews, III, Note, Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment: Ethical 
Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735, 741–42 (1998) 
(noting that, as officers of the court, prosecutors have a professional and ethical duty to 
safeguard the due process rights of the defendant). 
 122. See supra note 31.  
 123. See O’Hara, supra note 7, at 241 (“[S]tudies of victim impact statements indicate 
that the statements have little or no effect on sentencing, although they seem to contribute 
significantly to victim satisfaction in the resolution of the cases.”). 
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A. Systemic Integrity 
One major concern about victim impact evidence is that it may cause juries to 
impose the death penalty in an arbitrary way.124 For example, a jury could impose 
the death penalty because of the sympathetic character of the victim instead of the 
culpable action of the defendant.125 The introduction of victim impact evidence at 
sentencing has raised serious questions about whether juries are imposing the death 
penalty for impermissible reasons, such as their sympathy with the suffering of the 
victim.126 As Jeremy Blumenthal notes,  
Courts and commentators have criticized the use of [victim impact 
statements (VIS)] as tending to emotionally bias capital jurors, most 
likely in favor of a death sentence, but in any event away from the 
factors and evidence that are in fact “relevant” to the sentencing 
decision. These critics argue that the powerful emotion generated by 
VIS undermines rational and reasoned decision-making of the sort the 
Court has deemed necessary in capital sentencing.127 
Thus, there is concern that victim impact evidence will turn into a moral 
referendum on the value of the victim by inviting the jury to draw unflattering 
comparisons between the worth of the victim and the worth of the defendant, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In reaching our 
decision today, however, we should not be concerned with cases in which the victim impact 
evidence will not make a difference. We should be concerned instead with the cases in which 
it will make a difference. In those cases, defendants will be sentenced arbitrarily to death on 
the basis of evidence that would not otherwise be admissible because it is irrelevant to the 
defendant’s moral culpability.”).  
  One study found that the introduction of victim impact evidence had a small, but 
measurable, effect on the likelihood of the imposition of a death sentence in a mock-jury 
situation. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing: Reducing 
the Effect of Victim Impact Statements, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 120 (2009). Professor 
Blumenthal’s recommendation for counteracting the biasing effect of victim impact evidence 
was to provide more information to the jury regarding the potential for bias. See id. at 125. 
Given the strength of the victims’ rights movement, it seems unlikely that states will move to 
exclude victim impact evidence entirely. Giving the jury more information, however, can 
cause its own set of problems. See Morgan & Mannheimer, supra note 13, at 1088–89. Other 
studies, however, have found that jurors do not consider victim impact evidence and indeed 
may have already decided on a penalty before victim impact evidence is presented. See 
BURKHEAD, supra note 85, at 68. 
 125. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (“Payne echoes the concern voiced in Booth’s case that 
the admission of victim impact evidence permits a jury to find that defendants whose victims 
were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims 
are perceived to be less worthy.”); see also Abramson, supra note 120, at 123–24; Mosteller, 
Effect, supra note 41, at 26–28. 
 126. E.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1987) (“Defense counsel moved to 
suppress the [victim impact statement] on the ground that this information was both 
irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and that therefore its use in a capital case violated the 
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”). 
 127. Blumenthal, supra note 124, at 109 (footnote omitted). 
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especially in cases involving survivors willing and able to put on a show for the 
jury.128 Alternately, the arbitrariness could appear on a more macro level—if the 
death penalty is systematically imposed more often in cases where victim impact 
evidence is introduced than in cases where no survivors speak.129 This type of 
arbitrariness may become manifest through disparate use of victim impact 
evidence; for example, where prosecutors fail to utilize victim impact evidence in 
cases with minority or indigent victims.130 Either of these types of sentencing 
disparities are cause for concern from a systemic perspective.131 
A related concern is the fear that the introduction of victim impact evidence, 
which is likely to include visible displays of emotion, could lead to convictions 
being overturned on appeal. Under the Due Process Clause, defendants can claim 
that victim impact evidence “so infect[ed] the sentencing proceeding as to render it 
fundamentally unfair.”132 It seems distinctly plausible that victim impact evidence 
given by a survivor “may easily become excessively emotional and thereby 
produce a basis for reversing the death sentence.”133 Because of the emotionalism 
inherent in the situation, a concern about reversible error may influence a 
prosecutor’s decision to present victim impact evidence and a court’s decision to 
permit it.  
Because survivors are not parties to the trial or sentencing, they cannot present 
evidence of their own; their evidence can only enter the record as part of the 
prosecutor’s case.134 Therefore, survivors become witnesses for the prosecution, 
with all of the attendant perils and pitfalls.135 The ease with which victim impact 
evidence could cross the line may make prosecutors reluctant to introduce it in an 
attempt to reduce the risk of reversal on appeal.136 In addition, to become part of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 28–29; see also Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, 
supra note 15, at 18–19 (“There is some evidence that victim impact evidence, particularly 
when it conveys intense emotional pain, evokes sympathy and anger in jurors. . . . There is 
some evidence that the anger [the jurors] feel upon hearing victim impact statements 
translates into feelings of punitiveness.”); Dugger, supra note 28, at 382 (“The admission of 
victim impact evidence often leads the jury to a utilitarian assessment of the harm inflicted 
by the defendant.”). 
 129. See Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 28. 
 130. Id. 
 131. For a more detailed deconstruction of the potential due process problems raised by 
victim impact evidence including the difficulty of determining who qualifies as a victim, 
what can be said about the victim, the defendant’s ability to rebut victim impact evidence by 
introducing bad victim evidence, and the difficulty of determining what counts as “impact,” 
see Logan, supra note 13. 
 132. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 825 
(majority opinion); see also Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 29; Myers & Greene, supra 
note 13, at 506–07 (recommending that courts limit the scope of victim impact evidence 
admitted during trial or sentencing). 
 133. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 29. 
 134. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 449–50. 
 135. See id. at 465–66 (noting that survivors who oppose the death penalty are often 
treated differently by the prosecutor than survivors who support the death penalty). 
 136. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 25. However, some convictions have been 
upheld on appeal despite the introduction of prejudicial and inflammatory victim impact 
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the record, victim impact evidence must be admissible evidence.137 As such, it is 
subject to the trial court’s application of the jurisdiction’s rules of evidence, 
specifically determinations weighing the perceived relevance of the testimony the 
survivor desires to give versus its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.138 
These limitations on the evidence survivors may offer can leave survivors feeling 
as if they have been used and as if their voice has been taken from them.139  
Additionally, due process requires that defendants have the opportunity to rebut 
the first type of victim impact evidence discussed in Booth, information regarding 
the nature of the crime and personal characteristics of the victim. However, that is 
problematic for a number of reasons.140 While rebuttal is possible in theory, in 
actuality victim impact evidence is nearly impossible to rebut141 because it “offers 
an account of grief that can be neither challenged nor verified.”142 Any defense 
attorney would be reluctant to risk attacking survivors on the stand and thereby 
turning the sentencing hearing into a “mini-trial” on the character of the victim.143 
                                                                                                                 
evidence because it was deemed “harmless” in light of evidence admitted to support other 
aggravating factors. Mosteller, Real Rules, supra note 6, at 545. 
 137. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (“There is no reason to treat such evidence differently 
than other relevant evidence is treated.”); see also Blumenthal, supra note 7, at 78 (“[I]t is 
vital for there to be explicit evidentiary limits on the admissibility of VIS. It must be borne in 
mind that, because VIS is ‘simply another form or method of inform[ation],’ it is thus 
another form of evidence. Before VIS testimony is admitted, it should satisfy evidentiary 
relevance and undue prejudice criteria.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 138. See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the wishes of the victim’s family—in this case, mercy for the defendant—were irrelevant 
because they did not relate to the harm caused by the defendant’s actions); see also 
Mosteller, Real Rules, supra note 6, at 552 (“For example, a jurisdiction might determine 
that a victims’ [sic] views on the desirability or undesirability of a capital sentence is not 
relevant in a capital proceeding.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-254, at 32–33 (2000))). 
 139. See Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 12 (“To treat the victim impact 
statement like a private or familial expression of grief is to ignore the ways in which the 
survivor’s message is channeled, translated, even transformed in light of the expression rules 
and role expectations of the forum. The extrapolation from the private realm also elides the 
competing agendas that come into play when a survivor gives victim impact testimony in a 
capital trial. Specifically, the survivor may find herself in conflict with or in reluctant 
collaboration with a prosecutorial agenda that affects her own autonomy. Moreover, the 
audience for the victim impact statement—at least the only audience with any power to act 
on the information conveyed—is a collective entity: the penalty-phase jury.”). 
 140. E.g., Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 63 (“All sides in both Booth and Payne 
recognized that the defendant has a right to rebut victim-impact evidence with negative 
information about the life of the victim, a terribly distasteful prospect wrought by Payne.”). 
The better strategy for the defense may be to attempt to severely limit the victim impact 
evidence that is admitted, or to get it excluded entirely. Ellen Kreitzberg, How Much Payne 
Will the Courts Allow?, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 31 (detailing techniques defense 
attorneys can use to attempt to exclude or limit the admission of victim impact evidence). 
 141. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987). 
 142. Joh, supra note 13, at 25 (arguing that the admission of victim impact statements in 
capital cases fundamentally changed the sentencing process and improperly shifted the focus 
away from defendants and toward victims). 
 143. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 64 (“As dreadful as it is to contemplate, the 
consequence of Payne is the prospect of confronting survivors with the failures of the 
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In addition to being in poor taste, such a display could inflame the jury and increase 
the odds of a death sentence.  
B. Prosecutorial Ethics and Discretion 
Due process considerations are not the only constraints on survivor 
participation. Despite the common assumption that prosecutors and survivors are 
working toward the same goal, there are two aspects of the role of prosecutors that 
may put them at cross-purposes with survivors. As officers of the court, prosecutors 
are ethically obligated to conduct themselves with propriety and fairness,144 which 
may result in an undesirable outcome from the perspective of survivors who seek 
an opportunity to direct at the defendant their grief and anger over the murder of a 
loved one. Conversely, intense social and political pressures may divert prosecutors 
from their idealized role as justice seekers. In particular, a single-minded focus on 
obtaining a death sentence may lead prosecutors to exclude or silence survivors 
who oppose the death penalty.145 
The criminal justice system grants prosecutors broad discretion in charging 
decisions and sentencing recommendations. Due to the “vague nature” of victims’ 
rights statutes and the “lack of guidance” in Payne, that discretion extends to 
deciding if and when victim impact evidence will be given in a capital trial.146 It 
may seem incongruous to assert that prosecutors are not victims’ advocates as the 
aims of both are intuitively the same: convicting offenders. A slightly deeper 
analysis of the role of the prosecutor in our modern criminal justice system, 
however, reveals that prosecutors’ interests may quickly and deeply diverge from 
the interests of victims’ families. Prosecutors are responsible for exercising their 
discretion in a way that protects three separate (and sometimes conflicting) 
interests: that of the public, the victim, and the defendant.147 Because the prosecutor 
is obligated to consider and balance society’s interests in each and every criminal 
prosecution,148 his or her focus is much wider than that of survivors, who are 
generally only interested in seeing justice done for their murdered loved one. In our 
                                                                                                                 
murder victim.”). However, it does not appear that defendants have actually capitalized on 
their opportunity to rebut victim impact evidence. Mosteller, Real Rules, supra note 6, at 
546–47. 
 144. Matthews, supra note 121, at 739–40 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
84 (1935)); Gershman, supra note 63, at 563 (“[T]he role of a prosecutor is not to win a case 
(and achieve professional and media acclaim) but, rather, to behave in a fair and lawful 
manner to promote the cause of justice.”). 
 145. Vander Pol, supra note 8, at 709 (“With prosecutors under acute (and ever 
intensifying) political pressure to seek the death penalty, the families of murder victims who 
oppose capital punishment are being ignored. Despite the recent emergence of the victim’s 
rights movement, it appears such rights are recognized only when doing so would lead to 
harsher punishment for the capital defendant.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Gershman, supra note 63, at 561. 
 148. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is 
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice 
shall be done.”). 
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legal system, prosecutors are supposed to be public advocates, representatives of 
“the people,” not victims’ advocates.149 
Because of their duty to serve justice, prosecutors must guard against being 
swayed by the powerful emotional impact of victim impact evidence and its 
potential to cause them to improperly overempathize with survivors.150 Prosecutors 
who, due to their close relationship with the victim, end up taking the victim’s 
“side” compromise their ability to objectively evaluate the interests of justice in 
that case.151 Careful prosecutors may be reluctant to overly involve themselves with 
survivors, fearing that such close identification will cloud their focus on justice for 
society and fairness for the defendant.152 Alternately, survivors may be asked not to 
testify because prosecutors fear that the survivors will be unable to control 
themselves on the stand and that their emotional or inflammatory statements may 
be the basis for a reversal of the conviction on appeal. 
Some states have passed constitutional amendments providing victims with a 
voice in “important prosecutorial decisions.”153 But an obligation to consider the 
input and wishes of survivors may cause ethical problems for the prosecutor who is 
supposed to be seeking justice and vindication for society, not necessarily the 
victim’s survivors.154 In fact, abdicating responsibility for decisions that fall within 
the ambit of prosecutorial discretion to bereaved survivors would be a violation of 
the prosecutor’s duty to “exercise prosecutorial authority fairly, neutrally, and 
equitably for all of the people.”155 The public attention to victims’ rights, the 
political clout of victims’ rights groups, and statutory obligations to consider or 
consult victims all serve to focus the prosecutor’s attention on survivors and their 
desires.156 This focus becomes problematic if it “erodes prosecutorial control over 
cases and the predictability of outcomes when prosecutorial sentencing 
recommendations are disregarded.”157 
Prosecutors and survivors may also be at odds when the roles are reversed and 
the prosecutor desires a death sentence and the survivors oppose it. This issue may 
present itself more often than anticipated as a significant minority of survivors 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. See Matthews, supra note 121, at 739; cf. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime 
Victim: Evaluating Victim Impact at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 349 
(2009) (“As the justice system expands the rights of victims and imposes more obligations 
upon criminal justice officials to inform or consult victims about key decisions, the bipartite 
(state-offender) character of adversarial proceedings expands to reflect the interest of the 
victims.”). 
 150. See Matthews, supra note 121, at 747; cf. Steven Lubet, When Good People Do 
Good Things: The Ethical Dimension of Judicial Involvement in Victim Assistance 
Programs, 69 JUDICATURE 199, 200–01 (1985). 
 151. See Gershman, supra note 63, at 579. 
 152. See id. at 569–70 (“By involving themselves too closely in the personal tragedies of 
their victims, however, these prosecutors may find it difficult to carry out their ethical 
responsibilities.”). 
 153. Barajas & Nelson, supra note 29, at 13. 
 154. Matthews, supra note 121, at 735. 
 155. Gershman, supra note 63, at 574. 
 156. See id. at 570. 
 157. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 538. 
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opposes the death penalty.158 Prosecutors may attempt to exclude the testimony of 
anti–death penalty survivors159 and only call survivors who favor a death sentence 
to give victim impact evidence.160 This kind of discrimination does not comport 
with the recommendations of the President’s Task Force on Victims, “which stated 
that ‘better treatment of victims should be a high priority for prosecutors,’ and that 
prosecutors ‘must ensure that victims will not be victimized again, either by the 
criminal or the system that was designed to protect the innocent.’”161 This 
exclusion hurts survivors and may lead to feelings of helplessness and frustration 
with the criminal justice system.162 Limitations on mercy opinions ensure that 
victim impact evidence can only be used to hurt the defendant’s chances of 
receiving leniency and can prevent victims who are statutorily guaranteed a voice 
in the criminal justice system from exercising their rights. The assumption that 
survivors favor the death penalty and desire execution163 is so strong that even 
within the victims’ rights movement anti–death penalty viewpoints are often 
excluded.164 The desire to participate may be so great that survivors feel forced to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. See Barbara A. Melville, Does the Death Penalty Deliver Solace?, SKIDMORE 
SCOPE, Winter 2004, at 14, 16, available at http://www.skidmore.edu/scope/ 
winter2004/features/deathsolace.html (reporting that an estimated ten percent of victims’ 
families oppose the death penalty); see also RACHEL KING, DON’T KILL IN OUR NAMES: 
FAMILIES OF MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (2003); MURDER 
VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.mvfhr.org/victims-rights (“[f]or victims, 
against the death penalty”); MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, 
http://www.mvfr.org/ (MVFR is a “national organization of family members of victims of 
both homicide and executions who oppose the death penalty in all cases”). 
 159. CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 8; see also Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 
448 (“However, in the area of victim impact evidence in capital cases, that empowerment is 
being usurped by prosecutors and judges whose actions render the voices of many crime 
victim survivors mute.”). For personal narratives of survivors who have been excluded as a 
result of their opposition to the death penalty, see CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 8–
12. 
 160. Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 462–65; see also Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, 
supra note 15, at 15. 
 161. Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 464 (quoting PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra 
note 27, at 64); see also Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 15. 
 162. CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 9; cf. Deborah P. Kelly, Have Victim Reforms 
Gone Too Far—Or Not Far Enough?, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1991, at 22, 28 (“Victims who 
perceived themselves to be included or consulted in decision-making were more satisfied 
with the criminal justice system and more willing to cooperate with prosecutors in the future 
than those who were not informed or consulted.”). 
 163. CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 8, 15; see also MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 158 (“The assumption that all victims’ families favor the 
death penalty is so entrenched that families who oppose the death penalty sometimes 
experience discrimination within the criminal justice system from prosecutors, judges, or 
court-appointed victims’ advocates.”). 
 164. Joh, supra note 13, at 28 (“[N]either the victims’ rights community nor the Supreme 
Court generates or tolerates narratives in which victims’ families can exercise mercy, 
kindness, or forgiveness towards defendants.”).  
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hide their true views, or to mislead the jury about their views, in exchange for the 
opportunity to confront the defendant in court.165  
[I]f the victim’s family does not wish to seek vengeance, they are left 
with two equally unappealing options. They may choose to remain 
silent at the sentencing phase, possibly preventing them from 
experiencing any sense of closure, with the attendant risk that jurors 
will still assume that they desire death. Conversely, they may take the 
stand in an effort to convey to the jury their opposition to death.166  
As another commentator rather understated, “A procedure which inherently 
encourages one type of victim (who would recommend no death) to waive the right 
to participate in sentencing but not another (who would recommend death) is far 
from ideal.”167 
Silencing and exclusion can be particularly hurtful now that survivors are aware 
that they have rights and are often encouraged to exercise them by victim assistance 
programs.168 When participation has been held out as a means to begin the healing 
process but is then denied to some survivors, that denial takes on social 
significance much greater than that of merely excluding an irrelevant or 
superfluous bit of evidence.169 
III. A PARTICIPATORY MODEL FOR ALL SURVIVORS 
Because victim impact evidence creates the issues detailed above and does not 
further the traditional goals of sentencing,170 some commentators have proposed 
abolishing it in capital cases.171 Abolition would, however, deprive all survivors of 
the participatory rights won by the victims’ rights movement. Such an outcome 
seems both harsh and unnecessary,172 especially given that “[e]very aspect of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See Baird & McGinn, supra note 8, at 467; see also Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, 
supra note 15, at 19–20 (“Survivors who do not support the death penalty may feel the need 
to stay off the witness stand rather than be conscripted onto the prosecution team, but in 
doing so may be painted as (or may feel themselves to be) disloyal to the victim’s 
memory.”). 
 166. Vander Pol, supra note 8, at 725. 
 167. Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 282, 296 (2003). 
 168. Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 11. 
 169. Id. at 11–12. 
 170. See Dugger, supra note 28, at 398 (noting that victim impact evidence, while 
slightly retributive, does not further any of the other traditional goals of sentencing—
deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation). 
 171. Id.; Catherine Guastello, Comment, Victim Impact Statements: Institutionalized 
Revenge, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1321 (2005) (arguing that, because of their tendency toward 
vengefulness, victim impact statements should not be permitted in capital sentencing 
proceedings). 
 172. Cf. O’Hara, supra note 7, at 234 (“[V]ictims have been involved in the disposition 
of criminal cases for much longer than they have been marginalized, and they are unlikely to 
remain impotent forces in the disposition of cases. As a consequence, advocates must think 
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capital system has been recast as serving therapeutic goals—specifically, helping 
survivors heal and attain closure.”173 Many ideas have been put forward to modify 
victim impact evidence or create alternate procedures that would embrace victims’ 
rights while remaining within the bounds of constitutional protections for 
defendants.174 Proposals to “fix” victim impact evidence to better address 
survivors’ emotional needs, however, are widely recognized to be a “grievous 
error” which present insurmountable due process issues.175 Thus, the proposal 
advanced in this Note, post-sentence victim allocution, is not intended to “fix” 
victim impact evidence, but rather to remedy the injury to survivors caused by due 
process limitations on victim impact evidence, which necessitates the censoring or 
silencing of some survivors.  
A. Implementing Post-Sentence Victim Allocution 
Post-sentence victim allocution already exists in two states.176 While each state’s 
legislators are free to craft a post-sentence victim allocution procedure that meets 
the individual needs of their states, comparing and contrasting the key procedures 
implemented by Texas and Indiana provides a useful starting point for shaping the 
procedures adopted by other states.  
Texas provides for post-sentence victim allocution immediately after sentencing 
by a “close relative of a deceased victim”—defined as a spouse, parent, adult 
sibling, or child.177 The close relative of a deceased victim is permitted to appear in 
person in front of the court and the defendant178 and make a statement about “the 
                                                                                                                 
creatively about how to provide victims with participation at a minimal cost to existing 
procedural protections for defendants.”). 
 173. Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 1. But see Bandes, Empathy, supra 
note 62, at 409 (“The important point, both generally and in regard to victim impact 
statements, is that not every story should be told, or every voice heard, in the legal context. 
The question is always which narratives we should privilege and which we should 
marginalize or even silence.” (emphasis in original)). 
 174. See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 124 (incorporating expert testimony regarding 
affective forecasting into sentencing post-victim impact statement); Giannini, supra note 9, 
at 474–84 (expanding defendant allocution rights at sentencing); Trey Hill, Note, Victim 
Impact Statements: A Modified Perspective, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (2005) (requiring 
mens rea and limiting victim impact evidence to that information); Rachel Alexandra Rossi, 
Note, Meet Me on Death Row: Post-Sentence Victim-Offender Mediation in Capital Cases, 9 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 185 (2008); Beth E. Sullivan, Note, Harnessing Payne: Controlling 
the Admission of Victim Impact Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from 
Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 601 (1998) (constitutional amendment); 
Christine A. Trueblood, Note, Victim Impact Statements: A Balance Between Victim and 
Defendant Rights, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 605 (2010) (modifying existing victim impact evidence 
to provide more consistency regarding who can testify and what can be said). 
 175. Madeira, Why Rebottle the Genie?, supra note 44, at 1489. 
 176. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2004 & Supp. 2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 42.03, § 1(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). Texas’s statute has been sharply criticized. See 
Keith D. Nicholson, Comment, Would You Like More Salt with That Wound? Post-Sentence 
Victim Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1103 (1995). 
 177. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.01(1). 
 178. The statute makes no mention of whether the jury is dismissed prior to the post-
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person’s views about the offense, the defendant, and the effect of the offense on the 
victim.”179 The close relative may not ask the defendant questions, and the 
allocution is not recorded by the court reporter.180 
Where Texas provides for general post-sentence victim allocution, Indiana 
provides specifically for post-sentence victim allocution in capital cases but, like 
Texas, the allocution occurs directly after sentencing.181 Indiana, however, seems to 
invite a much broader category of potential participants, permitting a representative 
of “the victim’s family and friends”182 to give a statement rather than the narrowly 
circumscribed immediate family allowed to make a statement under Texas’s law. 
Like Texas, Indiana’s statute provides that the post-sentence victim allocution be 
made in the presence of the defendant183 and provides the opportunity to make a 
statement “regarding the impact of the crime on family and friends.”184 
States considering adopting post-sentence victim allocution should construe 
“survivors” broadly, like Indiana’s inclusion of “friends and family.” Additionally, 
Texas’s prohibition on directing questions to the defendant strikes an appropriate 
balance by allowing survivors to be heard without forcing the defendant to be 
anything more than a passive participant. Texas’s statute also seems to permit a 
wider range of feelings and opinions to be expressed,185 providing greater freedom 
of expression for survivors, including those wishing to express mercy or 
forgiveness, who are often excluded by the prosecution.186 Unlike Texas’s statute, 
however, states adopting post-sentence victim allocution should require that it be 
transcribed by the court reporter for two reasons. First, having a written record of 
the allocution could help survivors feel that the offer of post-sentence victim 
allocution is more than an empty gesture. Second, the record of the allocution 
serves to document how survivors actually feel, rather than how they are assumed 
to feel, which could help validate the feelings of survivors who do not fit the 
stereotype. Despite the Indiana statute’s reference to a representative, post-sentence 
victim allocution could also address practical problems survivors may face, such as 
mass murder situations where there are more survivors who wish to testify than can 
reasonably be accommodated in the sentencing phase.187  
                                                                                                                 
sentence victim allocution. 
 179. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, § 1(b). 
 180. Id. 
 181. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. The Indiana statute does not specify whether the jury is present or whether the 
statement is recorded by the court reporter. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Texas permits the statement to include “the person’s views about the offense, the 
defendant, and the effect of the offense on the victim,” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
42.03, § 1(b), whereas Indiana only permits a statement “regarding the impact of the crime 
on family and friends,” IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e). 
 186. See supra notes 161–72. 
 187. See Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 24 (“If, on the other hand, 
victim impact statements are meant to serve as a vehicle for healing and catharsis, the 
exclusion of any single survivor’s testimony becomes problematic for a different reason. 
Once the ability to make a statement is held out as a gesture of respect for victims and a 
means toward healing for survivors, the exclusion of any survivor comes to seem a cruel 
withholding—both of respect for the value of the victim’s life, and of the survivor’s means 
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Post-sentence victim allocution should supplement, not supplant, victim impact 
evidence that may currently be permitted during the guilt or sentencing phases. The 
key to this proposal is to shift the focus toward meeting the needs and desires of 
survivors in a way that minimizes the impact a survivor’s participation has on the 
defendant and the prosecution.188 Rather than expanding or contracting victims’ 
rights vis-à-vis defendants, post-sentence victim allocution would serve to assure 
more equal rights among survivors by providing participatory opportunities to 
survivors who are currently excluded altogether. Since survivors may have 
different opinions, post-sentence victim allocution should allow all survivors to 
speak out while simultaneously preventing dissent within victims’ families from 
causing confusion for the jury or reversible error for the defendant. As a genuine 
and legitimate part of the trial, post-sentence victim allocution would maximize the 
emotional impact for survivors who wish to speak out189 while at the same time 
minimizing the impact of their compelling emotional pleas on the defendant. 
Taking place after the sentencing of capital defendants who have been found guilty, 
it would effectively address the concerns from the survivors’ perspective that 
accompany limiting victim impact evidence without violating defendants’ 
constitutional rights.190  
B. Balancing Procedural Concerns with the Needs of Survivors  
Because the proposed victim allocution would occur post-sentencing, there is no 
possibility that the defendant’s due process rights would be violated by improper 
victim impact evidence or the jury’s improper consideration of that evidence. Due 
process constraints can create an inauthentic goal for victim impact evidence given 
during sentencing by making the statement a scripted, rather than a genuine 
expression of emotion.191 Survivors would also be freed from the constraints of 
evidence rules and due process concerns that serve to limit or circumscribe what 
they can say and how they can say it when giving victim impact evidence. Post-
sentence victim allocution could allow survivors to address issues (such as their 
                                                                                                                 
of achieving closure.”); see also Blumenthal, supra note 7, at 90 (noting that New Jersey 
limits the number of witnesses who are permitted to give victim impact evidence). 
 188. But see Kanwar, supra note 11, at 240 (“Whatever the actual merits and 
psychological benefits of individualization of victims’ experience of the process (e.g., ‘right 
to view’ statutes or ‘post-sentence victim allocution’), the social costs of an aggressively 
victim-centered discourse should be clear: it takes the focus off blameworthiness and 
individualization of the criminal accused, and attends to contingent and unstable emotions.”). 
 189. Madeira, Why Rebottle the Genie?, supra note 44, at 1519 (“This voice does not 
speak to garner a reply, but speaks to bear witness, to deliver a message, inviting the 
possibility for empathetic interpretation.”). 
 190. It could be argued that post-sentence victim allocution would violate a defendant’s 
right to a speedy trial. As a practical matter, most post-sentence victim allocution statements 
would likely be relatively short and the judge presumably would know in advance how many 
survivors wished to allocute and could thus allot time among them accordingly. See Nikki 
Morton, Comment, Cleaning Salt from the Victim’s Wound: Mandamus as a Remedy for the 
Denial of a Victim’s Right of Allocution, 7 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 89, 101 (2000). Ms. 
Morton also notes that post-sentence victim allocution does not delay the trial because it is 
not part of the trial. Id. 
 191. See Bandes, Sociology of Emotion, supra note 15, at 14. 
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opinion on the brutality of the crime or what they thought the proper sentence 
should have been) that, even after Payne, would not be admissible as victim impact 
evidence.192 
Although neither the Texas nor the Indiana statute expressly addresses the 
presence of the jury, this Note presumes that the jury would be dismissed prior to 
the post-sentence victim allocution to avoid possible face-to-face recriminations 
between survivors and members of the jury over the defendant’s sentence. The 
jury’s dismissal does not preclude the jury from learning the contents of the post-
sentence victim allocution and being affected by the sentiments that survivors 
expressed during their statements.193 However, the effect would be considerably 
muted compared to that which would be associated with a face-to-face 
confrontation with survivors. From a systemic perspective, avoiding the face-to-
face confrontation is probably essential to respecting the critical and already 
challenging role the jury is required to play in capital trials. 
The judge and prosecutor may feel uncomfortable when, after sentencing, a 
survivor stands up and proceeds to explain why he or she desired a different 
outcome for the case. The judge may feel as if the survivor is disrespecting his or 
her hard work throughout the trial and blaming him or her for a sentencing decision 
he or she did not make. The presence of the judge, however, is essential to making 
post-sentencing victim allocution an official and serious part of the capital trial 
process, which is, in turn, important to achieving closure and the other goals of 
survivor participation. The prospect of post-sentence victim allocution may 
encourage prosecutors to find out how individual survivors actually feel, rather 
than, for example, assuming they all support capital punishment and seeking a 
death sentence in their names. Additionally, the prosecutor would no longer be 
faced with the ramifications of victim impact evidence on his or her case. 
Exercising prosecutorial discretion appropriately, the prosecutor could focus on 
presenting victim impact evidence that is relevant and not prejudicial, knowing that 
survivors whose statements do not meet those criteria will still have an opportunity 
to participate post-sentence. As a result, the prosecutor would not need to worry 
about violating professional and ethical obligations by overidentifying with 
survivors in the course of witness preparation or feel obliged to exclude or silence 
some survivors to ensure imposition of the death penalty. Knowing that their victim 
allocution will occur post-sentence would also alert survivors to the fact that their 
opinions would not be a factor in sentencing, eliminating any misconceptions they 
might have about their role in the proceedings.194 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 28; see also Schwartz, supra note 47, at 533–34 
(“Another witness explained how his wife was shot a few months before their fiftieth 
anniversary, and how his impact statement to the jury was limited by the Court, which barred 
him from expressing how he wanted the perpetrator to be sentenced.”). 
 193. While this is a valid concern, it is not unique to post-sentence victim allocution. 
There is nothing stopping disgruntled survivors from going to the press or otherwise publicly 
explaining their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case. In fact, one family of survivors 
even spoke before the state legislature in an attempt to stop the execution of their loved one’s 
murderer. CUSHING & SHEFFER, supra note 30, at 9. 
 194. While it would not be possible for survivors to know definitively whether victim 
impact evidence given during sentencing had an effect on the jury, an adverse jury decision 
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Post-sentence victim allocution would provide survivors with a participatory 
alternative to the current choice between giving victim impact evidence limited by 
constitutional constraints and saying nothing.195 Some survivors are ambivalent 
about giving victim impact evidence in court because they are reluctant to share 
their rage and pain in such a public setting.196 Even those who are willing or even 
eager to give victim impact evidence may find the experience unsatisfying as their 
words are shaped and molded to fit the prosecutor’s trial strategy and skirt the 
defendant’s due process rights.197 Because post-sentence victim allocution would 
create opportunities for survivors who would otherwise be excluded entirely and 
would expand opportunities for survivors who wish to offer nontraditional 
statements, it seems likely that it would be embraced by the victims’ rights 
movement.  
It is possible that survivors who specifically wished to give victim impact 
evidence during sentencing but were not able to do so would find post-sentence 
victim allocution to be an unfulfilling second-best option. But, given the choice 
between post-sentence victim allocution and being excluded from the proceedings 
entirely, it seems likely that many if not most survivors would seize any 
opportunity to participate. 
Altering the structure of a capital trial does elicit concerns regarding the 
justice system in general. For instance, it has been argued that post-sentence 
victim allocution takes up the court’s time and makes the court appear 
undignified when it becomes a forum for such incredible displays of emotion.198 
Because survivors are the most affected by the crime, however, their feelings of 
fairness and justice are important in themselves. Moreover, they are also a key 
to the continued legitimacy of the criminal justice system with the public at 
large. Since the entire community’s feelings regarding the outcome of a case can 
be shaped by the feelings of the survivors, it seems that providing the 
opportunity for survivors to participate is a very valuable use of the court’s time. 
Significantly, post-sentence victim allocution would offer a forum for survivors 
whose thoughts, feelings, and desires regarding the trial do not conform to the  
 
                                                                                                                 
may leave survivors feeling as if they have been ignored. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 47, at 538 
(“[O]pponents dispute the benefit of victim participation for the victims themselves, as it can 
create false expectations that can be painful for the victims if their opinions are ignored by 
the court.”). 
 195. Survivors, like all victims, are “likely to feel negative, involuntary ties to defendants 
in the aftermath of violent crime,” and participation can mitigate those negative feelings and 
help survivors regain a sense of control. Madeira, When It’s So Hard to Relate, supra note 
22, at 457–60. 
 196. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 28 (“While some survivors want to demonstrate 
their anguish in court, others do not. Some who do not are angered that their grief is given 
such strategic importance and that they are required to demonstrate it in a certain way, and 
some would not want their grief to be used for the purpose of imposing death on someone.”). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Nicholson, supra note 176, at 1114, 1126–29 (critiquing post-sentence victim 
allocution in Texas and arguing that the statute “gives victims an unnecessary right, at the 
expense of the legal system”).  
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stereotypical assumption that survivors want vengeance in the form of death199 
and that only execution can bring closure.200  
In fact, it is often the case that, more than vengeance or execution, survivors 
want public acknowledgement of their loss and grief.201 Since prosecutors regularly 
invoke the feelings, beliefs, and needs of survivors, survivors should be allowed to 
speak out about whether or not the stereotypical “survivor” invoked by the 
prosecutor is anything like the actual survivors in the case. Allowing such 
sentiments to be included as post-sentence victim allocution helps to create space 
for survivors whose desires and beliefs do not conform to societal stereotypes. 
Inclusion of post-sentence victim allocution could have a catalytic effect—
empowering survivors who fear their feelings are unorthodox or improper to speak 
out thereby empowering other survivors to do the same. 
While historically the focus of the victims’ rights movement has been on the 
“front end” of the criminal justice system, since the late 1980s advocates have 
increasingly focused on post-sentence procedures.202 Recognizing that the needs of 
victims do not end when the trial does, many states as well as the federal 
government have created post-sentence rights and services for victims.203 Ranging 
from voluntary participation in victim-offender mediation204 to a statutory right to 
make a statement at parole hearings,205 these procedures focus squarely on 
addressing the rights and needs of victims. Like these other procedures, post-
sentence victim allocution would acknowledge and address the needs which 
survivors have that extend beyond testifying at or observing a capital trial. Most 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. See Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 29 (“While some [survivors] change their 
view [on the death penalty] as a result of the murder, most who formerly opposed the death 
penalty do not become supporters of it after the murder.”); Vander Pol, supra note 8, at 722 
(“[S]ince courts generally do not consider the possibility that the victim’s family would want 
to testify against the death penalty, instead of formulating new rules regarding mercy 
opinions, courts have simply applied the ban on opinion testimony without considering its 
underlying rationale.”). 
 200. Bandes, Closure, supra note 42, at 1606 (“Closure is too easily transformed, 
particularly in capital cases, into an ending that forecloses, too early, the societal obligation 
not to put an accused to death until he has a fair chance to show himself unworthy of the 
conviction and sentence.”). 
 201. Mosteller, Effect, supra note 41, at 29 (“[C]onversations with victims’ families 
indicate that more than retribution, some want to see public acknowledgement of what 
happened and of the worth and dignity of the victim. It may be that these results can be 
achieved through a noncapital guilty plea and a sentencing hearing in which the defendant 
acknowledges what he or she did and expresses remorse.”). 
 202. For Victim Services in Corrections, NAT’L CENT. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32565#Vic
timImpactStatements. 
 203. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) (right of victim to be “reasonably heard” at parole 
proceedings); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9502 (2007) (establishment of victim-offender 
mediation program); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-1002(b)(12) (LexisNexis 2008) 
(right of victim to receive restitution); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-26-4 (West 2003) (right of 
victim to make a statement at any post-sentencing hearing).  
 204. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9502. 
 205. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771. 
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importantly, post-sentence victim allocution offers survivors an opportunity to 
participate and be heard in a way that no other post-sentence right or service can. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the emergence of the victims’ rights movement, states have been 
grappling with how best to accommodate victims’ desires to participate in the 
criminal justice system. The Supreme Court’s decision in Payne further 
complicated the field by ruling that the admissibility of victim impact evidence in 
capital cases is a matter of state law. This has left states in a double bind. Survivors, 
as much if not more than other victims, deserve the opportunity for personal 
empowerment and closure that can result from participating in the criminal justice 
process initiated to convict and punish the person who caused the death of their 
loved one. However, death is different as punishment as well, so capital defendants 
are entitled to the greatest procedural protection the criminal justice system can 
provide to minimize the likelihood of erroneous or arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty. This double bind has left the promise of Payne unfulfilled for some 
survivors. The adoption of post-sentence victim allocution as a supplement to 
traditional victim impact evidence creates an alternative path for states to provide 
an opportunity for all survivors who wish to do so to speak freely and openly about 
their pain and suffering, while preventing the defendant’s due process rights from 
being violated by presenting such emotionally compelling statements to the jury 
prior to sentencing. 
  

